By Jameel Jaffer, Director, ACLU National Security Project

Benjamin  Franklin famously warned that "they who can give up essential liberty to  obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety." But  over the last decade, Americans — and others all over the world — have been  willing to trade many of their freedoms for the promise of security. John  Kampfner's new book, Freedom  For Sale: Why the World is Trading Democracy for Security, examines the roots of this trend,  and considers what citizens can do to counter it. In the exchange below,  Kampfner talks to Jameel Jaffer, the director of the ACLU  National Security Project. With the author's permission, some of the  questions have been edited for clarity.

JJ: Your book  notes the willingness of people all over the world to sacrifice civil liberties  for the promise — and often the false promise — of security. Why do you  think people are willing to make that trade?

JK: People make the trade not just for the  prospect of security, but for material benefits too. This has been the pact  since the advent of globalization and of a unipolar world following the  collapse of communism in 1989. Rather than reinforcing a desire for greater  liberty and democracy, the comforts enjoyed by an increasing number of people  around the world have increased a yearning for security — for cocooning, for  keeping what one has acquired. Public freedoms are the ones most easily given  away — free expression, free association and the freedom to take an active role  in the public/political realm. What matters more to people are their private  freedoms — that is the freedom to lead one's life unimpeded. This could be  freedom of travel, lifestyle and sexual choices, and most cherished of all, the  freedom to make and spend money.

JJ: But surely there are limits to the public  freedoms that people are willing to surrender in return for private freedoms,  material comfort and even physical security. Your book examines the experience  of, among other countries, China  and Russia. Those  are countries in which individual rights are very limited and the asserted  needs of the state are routinely invoked to justify new restrictions on  individual freedom. What can Americans learn from the experiences of people who  live under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes?

JK: One of  the less palatable conclusions I draw is that we are closer than we would like  to admit. The peoples in semi-authoritarian states and those in established  democracies appear to converge in their prioritization of freedoms (as I  pointed out in the answer above). Many Russians I came to know during the late  1980s quickly associated the political plurality of the Yeltsin era with chaos.  A similar mindset applied to many Chinese after Tiananmen   Square. Both the Chinese Communist party and the Kremlin of  Vladimir Putin made a different offer to their peoples — you keep out of  trouble, and we will give you specific and circumscribed freedoms, along with  strong economic growth. Compared to the lot of previous generations this  appeared a good deal. And yet, in the West, how many people really want more?  What proportion of the population of the United   States, or the U.K. for that matter, comprises "trouble  makers" — people who would be prepared to sacrifice their well-being for  making a difference in the public realm?

JJ: When you say that "we are closer than we  would like to admit," do you mean that there's a real danger that  countries like the United    States will degenerate into authoritarianism  or totalitarianism?

JK: I resisted the temptation to compare  countries, to give them scorecards for the state of their public freedoms. Of  course, neither the United    States nor Western European countries are  likely to turn into authoritarian states (let alone totalitarian ones). One of  the paradoxes of the post-1989 world is that while the number of democracies  has increased (according to data from organizations such as Freedom House), the  quality of these democracies has markedly deteriorated. This can be gauged  variously, from a reduction in civil liberties, to an erosion of the  independence of the judiciary, to the waning scope of investigative journalism,  to a decline in electoral turnout. Indeed, I can think of no major Western  democracy whose credentials have emerged unscathed in recent years. And the  more flawed those democracies, the more peoples in different societies lose  faith in democracy as their political destination of choice.

JJ: You also examine the experience of democracies  like Britain and India. In  what ways has the reaction of the United States  to the threat of terrorism differed from that of Britain  and India? Do  you think the United States  has been more or less successful than those countries have been at responding  to the threat of terrorism in a way that is both effective and consistent with  democratic values?

JK: The United States, unlike the U.K., had precious  little experience of terrorism prior to the events of 9/11. The extent of the  trauma suffered by the American people is often underestimated by foreigners.  That trauma led to a collective wish for the authorities to do whatever it took  to provide greater safety. A security clampdown was understandable in the  circumstances. More curious was the self-censorship that took place. The writer  Michael Kinsley described it as listening to his "inner Ashcroft."  Four years later, Britain's  response to the [2005] bombings on the London  subway and buses, was similarly irate. Tony Blair declared "the rules of  the game have changed." In India,  after the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, a large demonstration called for the  state to get a grip on the terrorist threat. One can see therefore the common  threads. Where the United    States, in my view, emerges more creditably,  is the existence of its written constitution. Even after eight years of a Bush  clampdown, the in-built checks and balances ensured the exercise of arbitrary  power had its limits.

JJ: I wonder if these "in-built checks and  balances" actually worked the way they were meant to work. It's true that  the U.S. Supreme Court drew some important lines — ruling, for example, that  the first iteration of the military commissions was unlawful, and that  prisoners held at Guantánamo  have the right to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court. But outside  the very narrow context of detention and prosecution at Guantánamo Bay,  the courts have been very deferential to the executive on issues relating to  national security.  And Congress was  complicit in many of the human rights abuses of the last decade — endorsing the  military commissions, for example, and endorsing — and even expanding! —  the warrantless wiretapping program. It's not  just that Congress didn't stop the abuses; it participated in them. If it's  true that the system is working better in the U.S. than it is elsewhere, things elsewhere  must be pretty bad.

But let me ask you about the transition from the  Bush administration to the Obama administration. As you know, the Obama  administration has endorsed many of the Bush administration's national security  policies — a surprising number of them, in my view — but it has reversed or  changed some of policies as well. It has disavowed torture, for example,  and released — in response to ACLU litigation — the Bush administration's "torture  memos."  It has also promised to close the prison at Guantánamo Bay.  Do you see these changes as  cosmetic, fundamental or something in between?

JK: It is too early to make a definitive  judgment call on Barack Obama. Just by not being George Bush and his  neo-Conservatives, the new administration was bound to strike a different  chord. Some of the measures of the Bush era have been reversed. Others, like  the closing of Guantánamo,  have proven to be more intractable than Obama predicted. As with other liberal  administrations, he is trying to make a difference without also alienating  conservative voters. The problem with this approach, if taken too far, is that  you end up trimming so much you make little difference in the end. That is his  challenge. Civil liberties groups should cut him a little slack, but not too  much. They must maintain the pressure for a radical, but sensible, rebalancing  of liberty and security.

JJ:  To me,  it seems that many of the principled and intelligent decisions that the Obama  administration made early on are now being reconsidered for purely political  reasons. In fact, as we're having this conversation, the Obama administration  is reportedly reconsidering one of its signature national security decisions:  the decision to try the 9/11 defendants in civilian courts rather than military  commissions. If the reports are true, it's a truly remarkable thing.  And if the Obama administration reverses  course on this issue, it will be difficult to see much light at all between the  national security policies of the second-term Bush administration and those of  the first-term Obama administration.

But one point you make in your book is that the  federal government isn't the only actor that matters on issues relating to  civil liberties and human rights. And you argue that civil liberties advocates  often make the mistake of focusing too intensely on the shortcomings of federal  government, when the atmosphere of fear that allows and encourages the  curtailment of rights is often cultivated at a local level. How would you  recommend that civil liberties advocates counter this atmosphere of fear?

JK: This is a  fascinating area to explore. Often the most pernicious and draconian pressures  are the ones applied locally and more informally. In the United States  this problem seems particularly prevalent — the doctor or teacher ostracized  for expressing views that are seen as not representing "mainstream"  opinion. In many ways, the U.S.  experience has over the years been the reverse of other countries, with the  federal authorities looked upon as the guarantor of liberties that would be  more easily sacrificed by powerful forces in communities and corporations. In  order to counter this phenomenon, civil liberties groups must continue to find  partners to work with at the most grassroots levels.

JJ: In your concluding chapter, you wonder whether  "perhaps people require less freedom than they would like to believe;"  and whether perhaps people are satisfied if the government "keeps them  safe, and allows them to lead their personal lives as they wish."  Is  that your ultimate assessment — that in the end we don't care as much about liberty  as we say that we do?

A: That is my assessment of the current  situation, but I hope it is an aberration. Yet, I must admit, the events of the  past year or so have not filled me with optimism. I was one of many hoping that  the collapse of the financial system might lead to a groundswell of pressure  for a deeper reassessment of political, economic and social priorities. If so much  of public life had been subjugated to the altar of consumerism, perhaps  something was going to change when the bottom fell out of the market? Alas, the  feeling now is that, as and when the major economies emerge from recession, it  will be largely a return to business as usual.

JJ: Well I  hope you're wrong about that, even if I fear that you're not. 

You end the  book by pointing out that it was "we the people," the common  citizens, who "allowed democracy to mutate into something it should never  have become." As a writer, you have at your disposal a uniquely  effective means of affecting change, but what action can ordinary people take  to defend their liberties, and their democratic society, against a government  that says it wants only to protect them?

JK: Complacency  is the greatest enemy. In my chapter on Singapore, the city-state that  provides the model in my analysis of the trade-off, I use the phrase: "consumerism  is the ultimate anaesthetic for the brain." The internet has been, on one  level, a great leveller, a means of empowering individuals. Yet much of that  empowerment remains atomized — people commenting and agitating in blissful  isolation. What is needed is a quest by individuals to see their role as  citizens, as participants in the public realm, as having an effect on the  quality of their communities. Sadly, over the last 20 years, democracy has  mutated into a single purpose — a vehicle for delivering material consumption.