FEBRUARY 8, 2012 6:01PM

Homs and the Pluses and Minuses of a NATO Ultimatum to Syria

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V Oksana Volchenkova, moye Rosskaya droozhba.

There are certainly risks in such a move, up to and including a Great Power War, in the latter of which the use of nuclear weapons has to be considered as a non-zero possibility, if not a large one.

Russian science after all had quite a triumph in uncovering a lake two miles deep in Antarctica this week, and so Russia should never be underestimated as to a potential adversary, nor however should the benefits of cooperation with Moscow be underestimated either, starting of course with mutual survival, but extending much farther than that.

As to Syria, any time the United States uses force over Russian and/or Chinese objections on the Security Council, it is always the case that under both their military doctrines, such a step can be called "hegemonic," the conditions cited in said doctrines for the at least potential release and use of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons as part of a General War.

Then again, there are also risks in looking too concerned about Russian or Russo-Chinese objections, nuclear ones most especially, to anything we wish to accomplish in the international system too, per their use of their veto on the Security Council.

As to the title, Homs is the center of resistance to the Assad regime in Syria, and it is in apparent grave danger of falling to Mr. Assad's forces, which means we are running out of time, unless Moscow can pull some diplomatic rabbits out of hats, like having Mr. Assad take up residence next to Mr. Putin's villa in Sochi, or some such diplomatically convenient location.

If Mr. Putin did that, it would look magnanimous, powerful, and make him seem to still cut a big figure on the world stage, something that might come in handy shortly from his rather cold fish point of view, and, it would preserve Syrian human life as best as can be foretold, at least in the short run.

Sochi is such a lovely place, right near the sea like Damascus, and there's no reason for Mr. Assad to ever appear before the Hague, and he should be free to travel to Mecca, and the South of France, Paris, and Switzerland, even London and New York, if quietly of course, as in such a situation as in Syria, what is needed more than anything is peace and reconciliation, not more death and destruction.

That aftermath has gone much better in Libya, and will continue to do so, Inshallah, than many expected or feared, and we should wish the same for Syria, as opposed to what happened after the removal of Saddam, which of course is the Banquo's Ghost of American Middle Eastern policy.

It was such a tragedy that Mr. Putin and Assad's friend in Tripoli had to be pulled from a crowd and have bullets lodged in his head, knowing that his dear son Saif would not inherit any family glory, or money, but bob between a box, the Hague, or pitiful conditions baited by Berbers.

Of course, Moscow also has longstanding interests in Syria that should be respected, as was the ultimate case when we took out Gaddafi and Saddam as to oil contracts, weapons sales, and other such pure as the driven snow Kremlin and Forbidden City motives, as such an arrangement would not alter the balance of power in a way adverse to the interest of any of the P-5.

Our motive here would presumably be partly to not back down over their veto, to demonstrate resolve that we will do the same with Iran, if it comes down to it.

The Syrian situation is something of a test case for Great Power cooperation over Iran, and thus rather more important than the case itself, as to interpreting Moscow and Beijing's actual motives, and therefore if it comes down to it, crisis behavior.

As with Gaddafi, and as was the case with Saddam, giving an opponent, or former semi-friend like Mr. Assad, a life saving out is often wise in such situations, although of course there's no guarantee that the target will take it.

Saddam and Gaddafi decided to stay and fight, and die.

Perhaps Mr. Assad would in the end chose that, although Sochi is so lovely this time of year, and Mr Assad was by all accounts a good opthamologist, and one who could still practice what he was really meant to do before his brother's rather unfortunate, and fatal, car accident, medicine, not politics.

If Mr. Assad's minions are leaving passwords around too freely, it would seem to make Mr. Assad rather vulnerable to certain kinds of strikes, also an option below that of an ultimatum per above, if under that option, he only would get to go to Sochi in a pine box.

On the plus side of a NATO or even just an Anglo-Franco-American ultimatum to Syria to accept the Arab League proposal before the Security Council, with sweetners on rebuilding and such for Moscow and Beijing, or face a massive bombardment from NATO forces, including strikes from STRATCOM's force of B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s, and with a need for strikes on the order of at least a mini Shock and Awe campaign of 1,000 PGMs in the first 48 hours,possibly a lot more than that, such an ultimatum does focus the mind, including giving those in Homs hope that resistance to Assad's forces is not in fact futile.

Of course, that's maybe what Moscow and Beijing don't want, and on the brighter side of things, in a propaganda sense, if Homs runs with blood, we can paint it all over Russia and China as to all their criticisms of American "hegemony."

On the minus side of such an ultimatum, Russia and China may object, and use force to do so, up to and including the use of nuclear deterrent threats that have a non-zero probability of actually being executed.

That of course is the catch, those pesky Russians and their nuclear weapons, as we might not get our hair mussed, but probably would, and it might go really poorly, like a Michael Jackson like haircut, especially if the whole thing was done as an escalation with a lot of warning, which we'd probably have to do.

Predator strikes and such at Mr. Assad on the other hand wouldn't have that risk, and could be rather lethal in character too, and deniable, on a good day at least. 

Can he at least see that the greatest statesmen know when to leave, unlike Mubarak and Gaddafi, and would that not make him the wisest of that so far rather unhappy "My Three Sons (of the dictator)?"

Even of course the hint of such a thing might make Mr. Assad re-think rejecting the idea of moving to a villa in Sochi, the South of France, even the suburbs of New York for all we should really care, as its high time we got over our squeamishness in America as to accepting political exiles, when the alternative so often is rather more a lot of dead people.

But, we do need to practice Great Power manuevering if we are to keep Iran non-nuclear, and so taking Homs and Syria more seriously than would be the case otherwise would be wise, and since this is rather obvious, also credible up to some point, at least that of a sequence of Predator strikes, and quite possibly that of a NATO bombardment, Russia or China onsides or not, if the farther one goes down that road, the more one has to really think about Russian and Chinese reaction, as usual, if not with anything other than a clear head about what is the value of the policy objective one is pursuing relative to the risks.

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If the Syrian people lack the stones to get rid ofAssad,we should just let them rot. Nothing good will come from any direct U.S. military action over there.
Well RW, it would show resolve as to Iran, to go the distance, like target practice of a sort, if that's not risk free.
Then again, in the context of hinting at that, maybe Moscow plays the hero, and everyone wins, and we get to practice in a cooperative framework over what's next: Iran.
Moscow and Beijing didn't veto the resolution to protect the Libyan people from Qadaffi, which in effect meant they allowed a US/NATO air campaign resulting in the death of one of their client dictators. It's natural that they don't want to repeat that mistake with another client, so the Security Council is off the table as a way of getting anything done in Syria. Then too, I doubt Assad wants to move to Sochi, so where does that leave us? Arming the Free Syrian Army is one option, but that raises the specter of Russia supplying arms to the "non-free" Syrian army and creating an escalating civil war situation with the West backing one side and Russia/China backing the other. Shades of the Cold War there, and a return to something resembling the bipolar world we had before '91. The more things change, the more they stay the same...
Maybe the Security Council comes right back in Nana, as the Russians just wanted to protect certain interests, and are as you say miffed about Gaddafi, although, what was the real choice with that guy once he called out the Air Force? Sochi is a nice place, and he and Putin can do judo together on the weekends, and Putin's the big magnanimous hero, not bad for March for him.... and, it goes over well with Syrians in the aftermath, something that has hurt China in Libya, since the Libyans resented Chinese fence-sitting. Time will tell, but Security Council cooperation usually beats the alternative, which as you say is zero sum competition, which if pushed far enough... not very pretty, or smart.