The Arab League is the expression of an ideal that's always been imperfect in practice as to a desire for Arab unity that began to emerge in the late nineteenth century.

One should most definitely not overestimate the unity of the Arabs as to peacemaking in Syria, as the entire history of the post WWI Arabs demonstrates that local variety has always been, and always will be, a strong limit on the ability of the Arabs to pursue common objectives, even as that is also something that makes an Arab League-led peacekeeping solution to the Syrian civil war fundamentally non-threatening to the State of Israel compared to many of the likely real world alternatives, which includes a fight for control of chemical weapons.

Moreover, as to the title of the post, and the argument for all the Permanent Members of the Security Council to defer more to the Arab League in the Syrian case of the Arab Spring, although there is much regional diversity among the Arabs, they still know each other better than the Permanent Memebers as to what is realistic for the future of the Syrian state.

A failed state with significant stockpiles of chemical weapons is a bad problem to be avoided, and if Arab motives are not going to be as pure as the driven snow, and there would certainly be predictable differences among say Egyptians, Saudis, and Iraqis as to the Syrian case, the level of understanding within the Arabs versus the Permanent Members argues for more deference of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, even as the Arabs must of course understand that respect for the interests of the Russians economically is the most likely path to a resolution of the Syrian Civil War that does not generate a humanitarian disaster or draw in the Great Powers that could generate an even worse disaster.

finis