It's sort of a metaphor as to the potential collision of interests in the Persian Gulf when a Japanese owned freighter smashes into an American warship, which happened this weekend.
It was just an accident of course, but it does point to the reality that Israel and Japan's interest in the Persian Gulf might not be the same, or functionally equivalent at the moment of decision, might not be perceived to be the same.
Perceptions of interests are interests at the moment of decision, if they may or may not be correct, which one could argue could be the case here, as to be demonstated below.
As to Allies, because of the structural power of Zionism, it is important from an American point of view to have good relations with Israel, just as because of the power of Japan ecoomically and the imperatives of Great Power warfare geographically, it is important to have Japan be a close ally, like Britain is for the Russian contingency.
Japan is mandatory to have onsides for the Chinese contingency, in which Great Power War considerations mean one wants Britain and Japan always on the American side, something people raised on asymmetric warfare theories might not pay enough attention to some could argue, especially since asymmetric warfare ultimately is an expression of the Powers trying to evade the unhappy possibilities of symmetric Great Power war, e.g. nuclear weapons.
As to the interests at stake in the Gulf, Japan receives a lot of oil passing through the Straits of Hormuz.
Since Japan is essentially completely dependent on foreign oil, over 90 per cent imports, things that endanger that supply understandably make them nervous, like a war between America, possibly Israel, and Iran.
On the other hand, as to correct perceptions of Japanese interests, having Russia and China increase their power in the Middle East at American expense isn't a good thing for how most people would see Japanese interests either.
Israel's interests in the Gulf are of course derived from Iran's nuclear program and more generally from Iran's definition of Israel as an enemy to be attacked from points of convenience, e.g. Iranian sponsorship of Hizbollah and Hamas.
Thus, some would argue that Japanese and Israeli interests in the Gulf collide, although there is another way of looking at that which argues otherwise.
As to that alternate approach, Russia and China use Iran as a proxy for their interests, which is to dominate the international system at American expense, which would be a rather different universe for Japan.
At the tactical level, if there is to be a war with Iran, American interests will be for the use of force to be absolutely decisive, which is possible geographically because of Mombassa and Diego as to non-naval strike forces being able to smash any Iranian attempt to endanger Japan's oil supply.
That doesn't mean that striking Iran is a good idea, or that it is risk free, hardly the case as Russia and China may intervene, athough that would be unwise, just that it is not clear that Israel and Japan's interests in the Gulf are incompatible either.