Por Honduras Lee, y nuestra discussion de ayer a la respuesta de su pregunta sobre los asuntos del programa nuclear de Iran, en que Lee sabia que Israel no ha firmado el tratado de non-proliferacion de armas nucleares, y en realidad es un estadoa de armas nucleares, entre 100 y 400.
There is no question that Iran's nuclear program is anxiety inducing, probably part of its intent, if that has ironic consequences as to the dialectic inducing anxiety induces as to posing grave risk to the Iranian regime pursuing that strategy, part of the general risk posed by Iran's nuclear program: uncertainties.
As to the uncertainty, it is in the nature of the Iranian program to be ambiguous in character.
They say it is not a weapons program, and make clear efforts to keep some doubts about that, even as they take steps outlined in the IAEA reports that are also most consistent with a weapons program, such as diggging a hole with instrumentation suspiciously similar to that needed to test a weapon, conducting simulations, developing alloys most useful for creating a weapon that can be put on the Shahab III, and especially by putting enrichment sites in cities with many shrines deep underground and surrounded by air defense systems, the latter of which are obviously designed to make eliminating them a daunting task, if one that could be done. (Using tactical nuclear weapons of course would be most efficacious, if truly an act of potentially awesome consequences to peace in the world, and so therefore presumably not what would be done.)
That collection of Iranian activities, especially in the context of regime statements and actions with respect to Israel and the West, America especially, doesn't induce a lot of confidence in Supreme Leader Khamenei's assertions that nuclear weapons are "haram," forbidden.
That is especially when one understands the history of "taqiyyah," deception in the name of preserving the faith, particularly well-developed by the Shia to avoid persecution by Sunni: they used to regularly lie about being Shia in locations where being a Shia was being an apostate, punishable by death.
That collection of Iranian actions and statements makes sense as to avoiding military action for sure a la the Israeli strike on Saddam's reactor at Osirak in 1981, if it doesn't evade the possibility entirely by any means at all.
As to uncertainties, it is in the nature of the design problem faced by a "new entrant" to the market for nuclear weapons to take steps to avoid detection that push the program in ways that induce worse uncertainties than would otherwise be the case, even as one could argue that such worries are paranoid; better safe than sorry has a place in life too.
As an example, states proliferating outside the NPT regime have usually had a uranium component, even as plutonium is more efficient for placing warheads on missiles, because it takes less plutonium than uranium to set off a nuclear blast.
The reason that is done is because one needs a reactor for plutonium manufacture, while with uranium one needs only centrifuges of some form, the latter of which can be much more easily hidden.
Unfortunately as to uncertainties that are danger inducing, with uranium there are "primitive designs" allowed with that material not true with plutonium so much as to efficiency in inducing an explosion that if not weaponizable in the sense of mating warheads to missiles, could be used as quasi-terrorist weapons.
Although that is of the form of what some regard as paranoia along the lines of the criticisms of Rumsfeld's remarks to the effect of "It's not what we know or don't know but what we don't know that we don't know,' that fact of technology and physics is the greatest danger posed of all by Iran's nuclear program as to the risks of inducing too much anxiety for a small state to handle, i.e. Israel, especially in the context of Iranian regime statements and actions with especially Hizbollah if also Hamas.
That right there, the tie to two groups capable of moving an object not normally considered by weapons designers as "too primitive," is the biggest uncertainty of all induced by the Iranian program, e.g. a "Hiroshima design" hidden in say a cedar trunk or light pole two feet in diamater and 25 feet long, to be mated with warhead material later. One can think of other ways of doing that, which is the point of the anxiety induced by Iranian actions trying to secure whatever it is that they are trying to secure also in the long run amounting to pointing a loaded gun at their own head.
One can hope at some point the Iranians will see that dialectic of strategy not having a happy ending in terms of Iranian national interests, even as to date, they don't seem to understand that the risk they are running with that program in the long run isn't going to be worth the likely price, if pressures take time sometimes too, although Japan didn't get that point in 1941, if to be fair, we asked too much in that scenario to make "coercive diplomacy" effective, the latter something to think about in terms of offering not just sticks to Iran, but some carrots of some form, before they have to be clubbed for the good of everyone else someday.