Killing an ambassador openly is an ultimatum, like when Leonidas pushed the Persian ambassador into the well. Killing him indirectly isn't an ultimatum, but a strong warning, since it's still an act of war to have proxies do it. Iran likes proxies.“The Zionist regime was defeated against not so advanced Fajr 5 missiles. Islamic Jihad pinned down 3 million people in Tel Aviv to bunkers, and announced that missiles had been provided by Iran. That was the least they had,” he added.
“Had Syria not supported Hezbollah logistically, Hezbollah and Hamas would not have won the 33-day war and 22-day war against Israeli assault,” he asserted...When Iraqis were resisting against Saddam, or when they were resisting US occupation, Iran supported them,”
Horses mouth that Iran killed at least hundreds of American soldiers, payback being a bitch some would argue, maybe thousands of American soldiers. He said that, bragged about it, for all the anti-Iraq war people who mocked talk of "Iranian formed penetrators" killing American soldiers, whatever you thought of initiating the war, not a good thing.
There's the horses mouth, state run media.
Now Secretary Clinton was correct in the Benghazi hearings, that in one sense, it didn't matter who killed the Ambassador per se, or why, since he and his co-workers are already dead.
On the other hand, it does matter as to interpretation of the meaning of that event, and response, or not.
That is because killing an Ambassador is a highly symbolic act, not undertaken lightly, or in this case so easily, in the sense of knowing the Ambassador was even present in Benghazi. There had been a stalking of the Embassy, if not by Ansar al Sharia to be discussed in a minute, but by another jihaddist entity not heard from before or so much sense, motivated seemingly, as usual in some circles, by the Blind Sheikh.
That detail is rather important, that it wasn't known in super broad circles that the Ambassador was even going to be there, as to some real planning being involved, compared to what you would really expect from just a bunch of gunmen hanging out around the campfire looking for something to do. That's fine to not care about the talking point, except there's a dead Ambassador, a highly visible signal lying around for all to see, which could be dangerous, or not, depending on why that happened.
That curious feature of the attack as to not really sounding like just a group of semi-employed criminals, or even a militia having a bad night is especially true as is who "claimed the attack," Ansar al Sharia, a hitherto not very well known local militia and semi-terrorist group. One says semi-terrorist group, because it's not the case that the group in question is much dedicated to anything, as its known to be very amorphous in character, more a collection of tribal elements in the mood to fight at the same time, paid by the Benghazi authorities as security, yes, but almost surely more to keep them peaceful than for them to do anything useful.
Does that sound very likely that they woke up one morning and decided to do that, all by their lonesome, to attack an American embassy in force, when the Ambassador happened to be there, which he usually was not, and it was not super widely known, and there was clearly no ransom motive, as to just being criminals?
No, it does not sound likely that they just woke up and decided to attack an American embassy, especially all by their lonesome.
That amorphous character would imply such people don't have the ability to arrange such attacks very easily by themselves, nor would they have a particular motive either.
One could say that they would move up in the world in a fluid situation, like Libya post-Qadhafi, but to take such a highly charged symbolic act, when the immediate response was protests, and which had happened before when they pulled a lot less of a stunt, both suggest that in and of itself, it wouldn't be rocket science for Ansar al Sharia to see that the percentages were low, unless they had encouragement, probably partly financial.
That raises the question of who, in which Syria and Iran are the obvious potential beneficiaries of said act, in terms of the killing of an American Ambassador being a good warning shot to stay away from intervening in Syria or attacking Iran's nuclear programs.
Of course, the extended deterrence threat some are reporting being issued by Iran's foreign minister Velyati certainly is consistent with that view of the functionality of the Benghazi attack, as to the "why" of that attack matters, if it's not best to harasss a Secretary of State in public on that point, since we are trying to get someone like Iranian Foreign Minister Velyati to cease with a nuclear program who says this, worth reading carefully, as States speak carefully on such things:Americans failed in invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, with heavy human and financial losses, and if they are rational, they will forget launching a military strike against Iran.”
“The Zionist regime was defeated against not so advanced Fajr 5 missiles. Islamic Jihad pinned down 3 million people in Tel Aviv to bunkers, and announced that missiles had been provided by Iran. That was the least they had,” he added.
“Had Syria not supported Hezbollah logistically, Hezbollah and Hamas would not have won the 33-day war and 22-day war against Israeli assault,” he asserted.
“Syria has a key role in the region on resistance against crimes of Israel.” he added.Velayati in response to a question about “if Assad’s fall, Iran and Iraq are next in the line, and if Assad holds power, the Resistance would lead its normal path,” said; “in practice, foreign policy is more difficult than in theory. This is a fact that Iran has supported Palestine, Lebanese Resistance movement, and the supporters of law and order in Syria. Iran will support Iraqi people against US control, and it will continue its support hereafter.”
“Iraqi people got rid of Saddam with the help of the US, but Americans could not replace Saddam with another puppet, and now Iraqis control Iraq. We do not expect more than this. When Iraqis were resisting against Saddam, or when they were resisting US occupation, Iran supported them,” he asserted. “Iran’s objective is to save the chain of Resistance,” he maintained.
That isn't quite the same thing as an extended deterrence threat as we would make it in the West, if the chain of Resistance notion has the same basic implications, including in this context being willing to kill an American Ambassador by proxy to send the hint to not intervene in Syria.
If that was the case, and one is planning on continuing coercion over the nuclear program with a credible threat of the use of force, one might draw certain conclusions to get the point across that we aren't bluffing about using force, like a car bombing at an Embassy, if others would draw other conclusions as to methods, including doing nothing, if in fact of course Iran and Syria did that.
They sure make good suspects, do they not?