This started out as a response to Frank Stein’s OS post about piracy off the Horn of Africa, but as my comment grew to dwarf Franks’ original piece in length, I decided to make it a blog of my own. Frank’s full post is included below in italics (or you can read it at the source)

Piracy has typically had one kind of end. A Navy tracks them back to their homes and then sends in their Marines to destroy the home base. Happily, today we do not need much tracking. Satellites have it covered. Even better we don't need to send Marines anymore. This is the mission the old B-52 was made for. Anounce tomorrow that the Saudi ship is to be turned over to its crew and the Pirates gone within two hours or we begin carpet bombing Somali ports. We will probably have to take out one to prove we mean business. Pick one that is on the smaller end and where there is proof positive of pirates operating from it. Then vanish the place. Then announce that any further attacks will not see negotiations only assaults on the ships and the wholesale destruction of Somali ports. End of piracy and only the SAS & SEALS are at risk. Good luck guys.

And here is my response:

If it were only that simple…

Piracy off of Somalia's coast finds its way into the mainstream press, but only because of the attention-grabbing lore of the term "piracy." The situation in the Indian Ocean is so much more complex than what we’re reading about back here.

Piracy wasn’t an issue when Somalia had a real government and a coast guard. Revolutionaries overthrew dictator Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991. Somalia has been in limbo ever since.

Two northern regions of the former state long ago declared independence and have since ruled as sovereign nations, but without international recognition.

In the south, near the former capital of Mogadishu, war continues to rage.

A distinct ethnic group has survived on Somalia’s desolate Indian Ocean coasts for centuries through sustenance fishing.

The region off the coast was/is legendary for its incredible abundance. This proliferation of sea life was maintained on into modern times because commercial interests were never allowed to move in. Once the Somali government fell in ’91, Somalia lost its ability to protect this ethnic group from outside corporate fishing interests.

According to international law, all countries with ocean coastlines own an exclusive economic zone ranging out 200 nautical miles from their shores. The U.S. officially recognizes the EEZ, as do most nations.

But, without a legitimate Somali coast guard to protect these EEZ rights, Asian fishing conglomerates from South Korea and Japan moved into Somali waters and employed commercial methods to harvest fish from within the Somali EEZ.  The coastal people watched helplessly as they were driven to the brink of starvation by the sudden over-fishing of their seas (in the midst of a civil war, no less).

Some keen fishermen finally realized that these commercial groups were seizing their catches illegally. The fishermen decided to form their own private coast guard—which was unrecognized by any international court or government.

Becoming desperate after the major Asian fishing groups ignored their demands for fee permits, the new Somali “coast guard” began seizing boats as collateral.

The international community came to the aid of the fishing corporations. Still, the small-time fishermen—without even the most basic modern tools of navigation—had some success. They made a little money. Ransoms were paid and fishing boats from far away toned down their raping of the local waters…

However, this small measure of justice again went unrecognized internationally. Worse still, it drew the attention of some of the warlords fighting for control of southern Somalia and Mogadishu.

Several warlords brought food, resources and guns to the coast and enlisted these generational fishermen—often by force—to continue to capture ships.

Thus, we have “piracy.”

The DoD and the U.S. government apparently understand the situation better than the media. We haven’t had many (if any) bombings to date.

On a personal note, I spent 76 consecutive days at sea off the coast of Mogadishu as part of an anti-piracy mission on a U.S. Navy vessel. I could write so much more, but I’m pretty sure that most of the stuff that we did remains very classified.

My ship’s mission was not as eye-opening as that last paragraph might lead one to believe.

We generally did jack-squat… And thankfully, no one was killed (Navy, Somali or other)—at least not while I was there in 2006.

But we (the crew members) did gain a better understanding of why we were there in the first place.