The Atlantic's views on the Office of the Presidency:

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200901/founders-mistake

"After a transformative midterm election like that of 1994 or 2006, the nation should require a compromise between the rejected president and the new Congress. A president whose party has lost some minimum number of seats in Congress should be forced to form the equivalent of a national-unity government. This could be done by requiring the president to present a new Cabinet that includes members of both parties, which the new Congress would approve or disapprove as a whole—no drawn-out confirmation hearings on each nominee. If the president were unwilling to assemble such a government or unable to get congressional approval after, say, three tries, he would have to resign."

That proposal was among others in the article that called for more Congressional power at the expense of the Presidency. This blog has long supported José de San Martin's belief that "strong institutions," not "strong men" ought to rule nations. I think the point of strong institutions is to cement and continue to carry out the policies of leaders even as they transition -- something Joseph II of Austria could not do, for example. Strong institutions encourage consistency: the sweeping reforms or, more importantly, foreign policies of a strong statesman would be maintained even if a weak one followed.

Thus, strong institutions minimize the damage weak leaders can do out of incompetence by being able to act autonomously and consistently. Strong institutions are not designed to actively incapacitate the executive, as the Atlantic wants to. Strong institutions incapacitate poor leaders and assist strong ones; the system the Atlantic proposes sets Congress at permanent war with the President -- a thoroughly distasteful and destructive state of affairs.

America's problem lies not with "strong men," but with weak institutions. The House and Senate are weak because of the nature of America's two-party system. Multiparty parliaments, congresses, and diets encourage consistency out of self-interest. Public choice theory assumes that the parties and politicians, rational actors all, desire votes and act accordingly. In a multiparty environment, the hard-fought compromised legislation or policy represents the concerted action of many different parties. Attempts at radical change isolates the renegade party, neuters its political influence, and eventually costs the party votes when it is seen as ineffectual. Consistency is the byword for survival in a multiparty system.

America's bipartisan system doesn't lean towards consistency. As soon as an effective majority takes control of either organ of Congress, the legislation that emerges is distinctly partisan. The problem with the Bush years was not that Bush was a poor leader (although your correspondent, as an aside, agrees with that assessment), but that Congress abandoned previous foreign policy and domestic policy as the President desired.

Strong institutions lend a state consistency. America's domestic and foreign policy changes each time a new party takes office because its institutions are weak, not because its leaders are too strong. America's institutions are weak because of its rigid two-party system: constitutional reform should be aimed at that, not at the presidency.