"We do not want to talk to anyone - not to Karzai, nor to any foreigners - till the foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan. We are certain that we are winning. Why should we talk if we have the upper hand, and the foreign troops are considering withdrawal, and there are differences in the ranks of our enemies?" - Zabiullah Mujahid, spokesman for the Afghan Taliban leadership
This statement, made in the wake of General Stanley McChrystal's resignation as head of NATO forces in Afghanistan, reflects a growing confidence on the part of the Taliban as they perceive - rightly or wrongly - disarray in their enemies' ranks. The perception of a faltering war effort isn't confined to the Taliban; growing numbers in the West are less than confident that the Afghan war is winnable.
A USA Today/Gallup poll indicates "a majority of Americans (58%) favor President Barack Obama's timetable that calls for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011."
In Europe, a Harris Poll for the Financial Times showed majorities "in Britain, France, Italy and Germany believed their governments must not send more forces to Afghanistan if Obama asked them to do so."
In Australia, a recent poll says "61% of respondents thought Australia should withdraw our troops from Afghanistan, 24% thought we should keep the same number and 7% thought we should increase numbers. Support for withdrawal of troops has increased by 11% since this question was asked in March last year."
These results aren't surprising. After eight years of war, enthusiasm for the mission, never that high to begin with, is dropping off noticeably. Even in the United States, what support remains is largely contingent on President Obama's stated plans for a drawdown of US forces beginning in the summer of 2011.
The Afghans themselves are rarely asked what they think, but a poll taken in January 2010 reported that 70% "felt Afghanistan was heading in the right direction – up significantly by 30% from 40% last year, and the highest figure since 2005” and that "More than two-thirds (68%) support the presence of US forces, and 62% support the presence of British and other foreign troops."
A case could be made from these numbers that the counterinsurgency strategy implemented by General McChrystal last year has shored up support in Afghanistan for the NATO/ISAF presence. With the new strategy's emphasis on securing the population rather than on force protection, civilian casualties since 2009 have dropped considerably. This has come at a cost however, as casualty rates among US and allied troops rose steadily under McChrystal's leadership, with 102 total killed in June alone. The trade-off - a willingness to accept more casualties in pursuit of increasing the security of and support from local populations - is one that was also apparent during General David Petraeus' surge strategy in Iraq in 2006-2007. It is unfortunately a double-edged sword; as civilian casualties drop and conditions for Afghans improve - which is one of the essential requirements for a successful counterinsurgency campaign - that success coincides with increased dissatisfaction on the home front as more soldiers are shipped home in coffins.
There are other indications that things aren't going according to plan in Afghanistan. An offensive in Marjah, begun in February of this year, has failed to secure the area, and fighting there continues. Still worse, the long-planned and much touted Kandahar offensive has been repeatedly postponed, indicating a disconnect between the confidence expressed by NATO commanders and realities on the ground. Another issue is the arbitrary timetable for success set by Barack Obama last fall when he outlined his new Afghanistan strategy. While he and his commanders have emphasised that the July 2011 target for beginning a drawdown of US forces is conditions-based, it has given an impression to Afghans on both sides of the conflict that the United States isn't fully committed to defeating the Taliban.
All of these concerns, coupled with the sacking of General McChrystal, and with growing disaffection among Western leaders for the corrupt and incompetent government led by Hamid Karzai, lend some credence to the Taliban's claim that they're winning. While the Taliban is incapable of any sort of decisive victory over US/NATO forces, they don't really need one. If they can convince enough people, both in Afghanistan and abroad, that victory for the United States and ISAF is impossible, they're well on the way to winning the war of perceptions. A model for the kind of victory they may envision is the Vietnamese War. North Vietnam never won a major battle against US forces, but ultimately won the war due to a growing disenchantment with the conflict among American citizens.
Alongside these difficulties are the longstanding strategic problems facing the mission in Afghanistan. There is a growing consensus among experts on the region that there is little or no hope of permanently defeating the Taliban, given the existence of safe havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and continuing support for the insurgents from elements in the Pakistani government. It is also questionable that any real progress is possible as long as Afghanistan is saddled with the increasingly problematic Hamid Karzai. The "mayor of Kabul", as Karzai is sometimes called, is reluctant - or unable - to deal with the rampant corruption which cripples his country, and is prone to periodic rhetorical attacks on his allies in the West. Karzai has become ever more committed to a rapprochement with the Taliban as a way to end the war, but they've so far rebuffed his advances. As Zabiullah Mujahid said, "Why should we talk if we have the upper hand?"
The coming months will be critical for the future of Afghanistan and its people. After eight years of bloodshed, neither side seems able to triumph on the battlefield, but history shows that there are other ways of winning - or losing - a war. It seems likely that, without any real prospect of victory on the horizon, the will of the United States (and the NATO countries and allies like Australia) for further sacrifices will continue to wane, making an eventual return of the Taliban to power in Kabul seem likely.
Note: this article first appeared in The Scavenger under the title "Stalemate in Afghanistan."
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Create call centers over there, Dell, Microsoft, BankofAmerica, all those great companies we know and love, can transfer their tech support from India, Phillipines, Tia Juana to Afghanstian Call Center #1 through 6 billion eight hundred. JOBS!! Good paying jobs!!!! With Tink as the CEO getting paid billions of dollars to pull this plan together.
Fuck the bombs. They been bombed before, by better fuckers than us my friend!! Then what do we do after the jobs?
Build water parks!! Huge mother fucking water parks!!! And we give those water parks to the people in the forms of bonds. Every Afghani gets a share of the profits, MO MONEY! MO MONEY! MO MONEY!!!!!
We make Afghanistan the Travel Paradise it can become. Those caves? Transform them into luxury hotels, again, the people get a share of that company as well. Mo money!!!!!
Then if they still don't want to give us their hearts and minds, we nuke the sons of a bitches back into oblivion!!!!!!!!! USA!! USA!! USA!!!
I kid. We nuke the world, fuck the plans for making economic and good clean water slides!!!!
REASON: CHEATER!!! CHEATER!!!
;) Yay!! First comment, first rate and first pick!! WOOOOO!!!
It is definitely in next few months or so that this will be decided.
For better or worse we are neck-deep in this quagmire.
"... commanders have emphasised that the July 2011 target for beginning a drawdown of US forces is conditions-based, it has given an impression to Afghans on both sides of the conflict that the United States isn't fully committed to defeating the Taliban. "
True, but without this deadline it would be like we elected John McCain instead of Barack Obama.
I am uncertain how much we can trust Obama or any Democrat of this era to end these wars. But if these promises of "drawdowns" comes true (likely well after the proposed date) then that would be a victory.
My post about Harry's yanked EP which was mostly ranting is somehow my most popular post ... even after I pour my soul into this blogging platform not once but twice...
Stranger than fiction...
-R-
Listening to the radio all night I hear Petraeus's new/old strategy will mirror the Iraq surge. I contemplate the "go big or go home" notion, because anything in between is just pounding sand down a rat hole.
How do you gain power in a poor country? By gaining control over resources and distributing them to your supporters, as needed. Those resources, in Afghanistan are heroin smuggling routes in the Taliban areas and foreign aid in the other sectors.
There used to be a reason - no safe haven for Al Quaida. And the Taliban ran a vile, oppressive regime. We no longer fight wars to gain territory, but to install friendly governments, ie., "create democracies". Which has not worked very well. This war is going to teeter on the edge for a while and then fall over a cliff, for all the reasons you mention. But not, I'm afraid, without many more deaths.
Mankind historically has been perpetually naive about war and its effects on those who wage it. Pulling out is a matter of self-preservation but the prevailing mentality is just the opposite. The deadlines and the rest of the farcical propaganda is believed by no one but with a knowing wink we discuss it with gravity then ignore it when reality proves it wrong.
America is the land of the pussies. We're too scared not to fight.
Rated.
You know me. Call it victory... call it defeat, but just get out.
I wish I could at least believe that we've learned something from this, but I know we haven't. It will happen again. Maybe not in my lifetime, but it will happen.
They are literally killing us with those roadside bombs. These things are made from fertilizer– probably supplied by the US Dept of Agriculture. This is so similar to the VC tactics in SE Asia that I still cannot believe that our top officials haven’t figured this out. The Taliban gives some poor unemployed Afghani $25 to plant one of these bombs – and then once you’re hired you're in for life. Or you lose your life.
The time to exit was eight years ago. Now it’s time to run (again).
Well done.
As Harry points out in his comment, there won't be any "winning" as such in Afghanistan. Even if we had committed fully to the mission there - which we've never done - there would only be the options of bad and slightly less bad. The course chosen by President Obama is the worst of both worlds; the bleeding will continue for several more years at least, but we'll end up leaving once the domestic political costs of the war grow too high for him or his successor. Once we and our allies are gone, within a year or two the Taliban will roll back into power in Kabul, and Afghanistan will revert to being what it was before 9/11, a giant Disneyland for terrorists. I don't see how anyone can think that's a good thing, but it's the reality we're looking at.
Regarding Marjah, yes, we've taken the town, but by now the area around it should be secure too, or more secure than it is. Counterinsurgency is supposed to work in a inkblot fashion; you take and hold a place and gradually spread a zone of security out from there. That hasn't happened around Marjah, or at best, it's happening too slowly.
Substitute Iraq and Afghanistan for Vietnam.
Well written and on point.
go you
How indeed? Yet, given that we've telegraphed our intent to bail, that's exactly what we're doing. Afghanistan is vastly different from Vietnam, but there are similaritites too. I heard some talking head the other day use the phrase "Afghanization of the conflict." Remember "Vietnamization"? It's code for "We're getting out, it's not worth it." What I'd ask Obama, just as we asked Nixon, is, if we're getting out, why are we still letting our people die there?
Matt, my take is that the timetable was/is a bad idea. It sends a signal to the Afghan people and to the Taliban that we've decided to lose. That's an oversimplification of course, but imagine if you're a farmer in Helmand or Paktika. All you know for certain is that every day you're forced to make a choice between supporting the Taliban or supporting the US and NATO, but now you've been told that the Amriki are leaving next year. What would you do? It's just an astonishingly bad idea in a counterinsurgency campaign to give the population you're trying to win over and the enemy the impression that you're going to cut and run.
A stone age tribal culture, an attempt at building a national government drowning in a sea of corruption and incompetence, religious fanaticism, medieval mindset, a more than pathological hatred/distrust of outsiders do not good allies make.
We were the saviors and had our motives been pure we easily could have won their hearts and minds and made true allies. It's all a human tragedy to which we remain comfortably blind and ignorant. The only thing the American public has been outraged by over the last decade is Janet Jackson's breast.
Some people say it's disloyal to say we do any wrong but I say it's treason not to point out our transgressions. And also fatal.
as long as america thinks 'winning' means dispatching the marine corps, with support from the zombie killers driving the drone bombs, the taliban have no recruitment problems. they live there, they have no logistic problems. they are illiterate form boys who actually believe in and practice their religion, no ideology problems. and they don't have to win anything, just stay alive and shooting at targets of opportunity, in the certain knowledge the faranghis will get tired and leave. one can almost feel sorry for the fools who fight for the empire.
it is not really difficult to win in afghanistan, it just requires honesty, respect, and patience from america's rulers. all they have is arrogance, and a big military machine.
That about nails it Al. Graveyard of empires or not, nothing was written in stone in Afghanistan, not at first. By choosing the course we did, we opted for defeat. Anybody who was paying attention saw what was coming.
a. Panama, where we used hard metal music to dislodge Noriega from Vatican property to prevent him from spilling the beans on our Central American guns for cocaine operation. This operation was called "Just Cause," and the just cause was to keep Noriega silent; and
b. Grenada, which was called "Operation Urgent Fury," and the urgency was to get the marine barracks destroyed in Lebanon 2 days before to the tune of 241 american lost lives off the front pages, so the delusion of morning in america could be perpetuated.
-R-
Mark, I'm trying to think of another one but drawing a blank. We did win the first Gulf War, but that led to the whole Operation Iraqi Freedom thing 12 years later and....oh well, never mind.
Of course, the fact that we've, in the interim, thrown our entire economy, especially manufacturing and small business, into the toilet, and depend on arms and war to survive is tangential to the topic at hand.
You're right Scanner, it's time to go. The idea was to get Al Qaeda, but Al Qaeda is safe and sound just over the border in Pakistan's tribal areas. Sure, we hit them with drones every now and then, but they'll be OK. Once we leave they'll come back to Kabul along with the Taliban, and everything will be as it was September 1oth, 2001. It does kinda make me wonder why we even bothered.
And I think that you're 100% correct.
Well done!!
Bechtel, Halliburton, Blackwater, the oil and mining companies and our weapons manufacturers have already won and keep on winning as long as this imperialist endeavor continues or until the American Empire collapses from its own greed and stupidity.
(R)ated for unfortunate accuracy.
I believe you are jumping the gun there, Harry. Most likely scenario is that you are right, but we are not there yet. I know it's tempting to get out ahead of the ball but it's still pure speculation and should be labeled as such.
My theory (see I declared it) is that Obama is looking to pass this mess off to the next president, but I don't talk war strategy with Obama so who really knows.
Cogent
Non Histrionic
Piece
Kudos!
I don't think abandoning Afghanistan and its people to the Taliban and the terrorists who ride their coat-tails is a good idea. We already tried that, when, after showering many billions of dollars worth of arms on the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation, we completely disengaged after the Russian withdrawal. The end result of first empowering militant Islamic fundamentalism for our own purposes and then letting the Afghan people twist in the wind when it seemed convenient to do so was 9/11. There's no way to predict what will happen once the Taliban return to power after our own withdrawal, but it's not likely to be good for Afghanistan, Central Asia, or our own interests.
Inquisitive, I haven't yet seen "Taxi to the Dark Side", but it's on my Netflix queue. On a related topic, there's a book by Sarah Chayes, "The Punishment of Virtue", which I highly recommend. Here are a few words from Ms. Chayes on Afghanistan:
Afghanistan, once thought of as the “good war,” is on the brink of being lost. But the failure of the US and international effort there is not a foregone conclusion. A thoughtful, wide-ranging shift in strategy on the part of the Obama Administration can still avert Afghanistan’s likely fate as an irrevocable – and dangerous – failed state, with ominous implications for the region and the rest of the world. The United States should redefine its objectives in favor of the Afghan people, not the Afghan government. In a counter-insurgency, the people are the proverbial prize. It is only by supporting the Afghan people – not abusive powerbrokers – in their effort to reconstitute their social, economic, institutional, and cultural fabric, that stability in Afghanistan can be achieved, and the country be durably denied as a sanctuary for terrorists. But divergent analyses of Afghan people’s situation and desires carry profoundly different policy implications. One school of thought, championed especially in the UK and by some US academics, maintains that Afghanistan is fundamentally a tribal society, which has never been governed from the center, and cannot be. Corollaries of this thesis include the notion that “functional corruption” is the norm, and that Pashtuns’ cultural backwardness makes them innately permeable to Taliban ideology. The other analysis, more closely attuned to what the Afghan population has been saying since 2001, highlights the historical inaccuracy of this vision. For much of the past century, and certainly within living memory (1950s-1979), Afghanistan was governed from Kabul by a well-constituted and legitimate authority, which enjoyed monopoly of the use of force, wielded sophisticated judicial processes, both governmental and traditional, and fostered cultural dynamism and expanding civil liberties. This analysis sees tribal forms of social organization as a kind of dual citizenship – complementary to, not exclusive of, national identity and allegiance. Tribal social structures have come to the fore in moments of acute crisis, when the state itself was under attack (eg. by the British Empire, the USSR). The Afghan population harks back to the period of functioning central authority with nostalgia, and sees excessive tribalism as an aberration – an aberration that grew so extreme in the early 1990s that even the Taliban seemed preferable. In other words, southern Afghans’ acquiescence to the Taliban in 1994 was not due to their adherence to extremist ideology, but rather to their acute suffering at the hands of the predatory warlords who dominated the landscape in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. Evidence for this view is that in Kandahar – the Taliban’s very heartland – the demise of that regime in 2001 was greeted with universal joy and enthusiasm for the nascent Karzai administration and international presence in Afghanistan. Afghans, even the notoriously conservative southern Pashtuns, sent their girls to school in droves, and looked to President Karzai and the United States to help them build responsible and responsive government structures not tainted by extremist ideology. Instead, obsessed by a counter-terrorism agenda, the United States reempowered the warlords that the population had repudiated in the early 1990s, for use as proxies in the hunt for al-Qaeda. It is because the US and its allies in NATO and the UN have consistently backed these men with treasure and weaponry and moral support, demanding no accounts in return, that southern and eastern Afghanistan has once again become permeable – reluctantly – to the Taliban. For, as painful as the extremists’ exactions are, they are seen as no more painful than the behavior of the government officials we back. The most critical element of a new approach to Afghanistan must be an urgent focus on good governance. For, the above analysis indicates a paradox. While international officials, especially in the UN, tout the Afghan government as “legitimate” and “democratically elected,” Afghans experience the opposite. They say that the United States imposed the current government officials upon them. And that it is therefore our responsibility to provide some means of recourse against their depredations.
That sounds like good advice to me, but it's advice we've chosen to ignore. As I said in comments yesterday, defeat in Afghanistan wasn't written in stone. It's still not written in stone. The Taliban can't beat us, but we're perfectly capable of beating ourselves, and are in fact well on the way to doing so. To put it in the simplest terms possible, by helping warlords rather than helping the Afghan people, we've chosen defeat.
Obama was pressured into this not only by his campaign rhetoric but by Petraeus and McCrystal and the defense contractors. All of this are damn bad reasons to go to war. And it's been estimated that if we really wanted to "win" in Afghanistan, we'd have to have a million troops over there in addition to a foreign aid component probably hundreds of times greater than what we're currently doing.
Ultimately, what's the point of staying there? Absolutely no point.
US OUT OF AFGHANISTAN NOW
As usual, I look to you to tell me what's going on in the Middle East and Afghanistan. I'm glad you're writing for some fancy website that publishes actual journalism. I hope you're getting the big buck. When is the New York Times going to get on the ball and give you a column?
People have said "Vietnam" all along about Afghanistan, and that's optimistic. Vietnam never had any interest in launching terror attacks against the U.S. Me, I've always been against this war, and I know you felt it was necessary. But now that we're losing it, is it possible that the Taliban, having done its strutting and crowing over U.S. defeat, will think twice about sponsoring an attack on us? I mean, this was costly for them as well. Did this war do any good?
Did this war do any good? No, not if we withdraw and the Taliban roll back into power. Before 9/11 they had no interest in carrying out attacks outside of Afghanistan. Now they're actively seeking the overthrow of the Pakistani government, or at least their close Pasthun allies in the FATA are, and the Christmas attack last winter demonstrates they have the will and the ability to strike directly at the US. There are two separate groups of Taliban actually, one from north of the Durand line, one from south of it, but they're closely intertwined. Once the northern group are back in Kabul, Al Qaeda (whose eradication was the original objective when we first went in) will come right along with them.
We must chat, sometime when it's not 2 o'clock here and 4 o'clock there.
Now, really, go to bed. Have fun at the reunion. Can't wait for the pics.