I have just finished reading Kissinger's book "Diplomacy," as well as parts of Winston Churchill's book "The Gathering Storm." Kissinger's book is excellent and although I have reservations about the majority of Churchill's multivolume WW2 series, I found his insights regarding Munich in the series' first volume to be erudite, particularly in regard to diplomatic strategy. 

 In my opinion, two major peace treaties have come to define American foreign policy and diplomatic consciousness: Munich and Versailles. 

Versailles has come to represent the failure of a brutal form of victors' justice, of what happens when the winners of a war exact too stringent of a peace (the harsh reparations of the French and their occupation of the Saar when the Germans couldn't meet the payments, the catastrophic inflation of the Weimar Republic, caused when Germany tried to print more money to meet French reparation demands; when a worldview that is too idealistic (self-determination for ethnic groups in Eastern and Central Europe) creates a geopolitical situation that is untenable (namely, the creation of a multitude of mini-states between the Great Powers of Russia and Germany, states that were bound to be gobbled up without effective and credible guarantees of security and mutual defense). 

Versailles also stands for the principle, Kissinger alludes to, that countries should not make committments they are not prepared to fight over. This refusal or reticence causes said nations' credibility to decline and emboldens/encourages aggressive challengers to the status quo.

In Europe, Hitler's constant challenging of Versailles, from the re-occupation of the Rhineland and Saar, re-armament, and the Anschluss with Austria (all prohibited expressly by Versailles and its follow-up conferences and treaties, such as Locarno and Stressa),  caused stress among the French and British, but many of them felt that the terms of Versailles were blatantly unjust and that they had no moral grounds on which to oppose Hitler, especially when he was only demanding the unification of ethnic German majority-lands located in other nations, with Germany proper. The allies felt that this was square with the principle of self-determination and they weren't prepared to fight a war over this. 

Yet Kissinger implicitly makes the case that this is what caused the death of Versailles-the fact that nations drew a line in the sand, but then refused to support said position when the madman called their bluff. 

This is an important lesson. When one drafts a treaty, an agreement or even a plea bargain, one must only agree to that which one is capable of enforcing and/or performing in accordance with. Because if one fails, one will be seen as weak by the other side, and depending on who your enemy is, this could invite a potential attack. 

Munich presents another lesson, that of not appeasing aggression. We all know the story. Hitler wanted the ethnic German majority located in the Sudetenland, a mountainous region of Bohemia in Czechoslovakia to become a part of the Reich.  The problem was that most of the Czechs' armament factoris (the Skoda works) their best geographical defenses (mountains and choke-points) and their best forts and military bases, as well as weapon stores, were all located in this highly strategic area. The Allies sold the Czechs down the river and gave the Sudetenland to Germany in order to avoid war. Despite the Munich agreement, Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia anyway, this time with the assistance of Hungary, Poland and Romania, who each gobbled up a portion. 

On the other hand, the British used this time to significantly build-up and train their military and airforce, slowly realizing the threat Hitler posed to civilization. The French also used this time to build-up their military. Had they declared war too early, they might have found themselves fighting an enemy they were, as of yet, unprepared to face. Indeed, even when they declared war when they did, in 1939, they were still rather unprepared, due to almost two decades of pacifism and disarmament.

That said, by the time Hitler's western offensive of 1940 came, the Western Allies, combined, could match the Germans militarily. Indeed, Hitler feared the material resources of the Allies and for this reason pushed for a lightening victory in the West. Hence the Blitzkrieg.

In any event, the lessons of the era are clear. One should be careful when negotiating with aggressive bully nations, but one should also be benevolent when dealing with defeated nations. 

That said, could the lessons of Versailles and Munich have been inaccurately drawn? 

Our entire Cold War strategy was based on a refusal to "appease" the dictators, thinking this would encourage aggression. This has brought us into many wars as a result, such as Vietnam and Korea. On the other hand, our wish to help our former foe, or even potential foe, by way of building up their economy has caused us to unleash a massive barrage of foreign aid, like the Marshal Plan, throughout the world. This has had positive results for American diplomacy and our economy, in terms of bringing the Europeans closer to us. But in regard to Asia and the rest of the world, this policy has had a different effect. Indeed, we seem to have financed and underwritten the economic development and advancement of our primary global competitors, costing the jobs of thousands of Americans. 

If we want to do better in the years ahead, we need to re-examine Munich and Versailles. We need to see if we are applying their lessons correctly.