Don Rich's Open Salon Blog

Stabilizing Euro & U.S. Interest:1930's Beggar Thy Neighbor

Wed, 30 May 2012 17:05:59 -0400

The dual institutional structure of NATO and what evolved into the European Union has well served American interests in physical survival, economic growth, and cultural enrichment for the last sixty five years, if those arrangements are not without flaws now, due to drifts of power, and therefore perceptions of interest, over time.

Such drift is normal; it's how it's managed that matters, if historical understanding is then important so that babies don't go out with bathwater.

As to the history worth remembering, the baby, and the allusion in the title of the post as to American interests in Euro stabilization, in the 1930s, European nations devalued their currencies in what is now known as beggar thy neighbor policies.

In other words, countries tried to devalue their currencies, and restrict trade, in order to pass on the costs of dealing with the macroeconomic shock of the Great Depression to someone else: Beggar Thy Neighbor.

That's fine when one country does that, but a recipe for disaster when everyone tries it all at once, as both types of policies undermine the institutional arrangements behind capitalism, and which is what happened in the 1930s as to the destruction of the trading order in Europe

That was something which harmed the U.S. recovery through bank failures like Credit Anstalt in 1931, and generalized policy uncertainty thoughout the whole decade, independent of the German revanchism represented in the rise of Hitler.

Thus, if allowing Greece into the Euro was a marginal decision, as the Greeks fiscal profile was such as to create something of a hostage situation with the Germans, who were bound to be unhappy bailing out a Greece that had been the recipient of massive amounts of economic assistance on entry to the European Union on the order of more than $20 billion, and the Greeks are unlikely to enjoy hectoring Germans, nonetheless, on balance it remains in American interest to assist European stabilization efforts as much as is possible.

That might not be politically popular in a time of some real hardship here, as to the case for the Federal Reserve system to place some amount of Eurobonds on their balance sheet should such instruments be created, although stating a willingness to do that would increase the probability of its occurence, but then look what happened the last time that global cooperation failed; anarchy and war.

Which do you like more?

finis

Why NATO is Vital: Managing Germany & Russia

Wed, 30 May 2012 15:05:03 -0400

It's not really polite in some ways to point out that absent NATO, we would be unleashing a State, Germany, that is a core American ally, but that is what NATO is as to a leash.

The alliance with Japan and Korea serve the same functions as to stabilization, as the second the United States were to leave East Asia, one would see a contest for power over Korea between Japan and China that would almost certainly involve the Japanese becoming an overtly nuclear-armed state.

As to the centrality of NATO in managing Germano-Russian relations and the stability of the international system as a whole, do you really think you want to find out what the world looks like when Germany is cut loose from any nuclear deterrent guarantee, and has to decide if it wants to face off against a nuclear armed Russia, and Israel, without nuclear weapons under its control?

Think about that a little bit.

Moreover, locking in Germany to NATO balances Russian power in Europe, if how one manages Poland and the Baltics is something of a dicey question, if unavoidable, save for being very, very careful to never allow for any provocation whatsoever over Kaliningrad, as a Russian enclave surrounded by Poland and Lithuania is a Russian false flag waiting to happpen, if and only if it is credible; hence maintaining distance.

But as to the ongoing centrality of NATO, it remains the case that it serves to stabilize Germany's place in Europe, beneficial to all other European nations, while balancing Russian in a non-threatening fashion so long as offensive weapons are not deployed near the territory of the Russian Federation or what the Russians call the near abroad, namely Byelorus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus.

finis.

Case for a Bombardment of Syria with One PGM per Civilian

Tue, 29 May 2012 13:05:23 -0400

We are attempting to conduct high stakes diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear weapons program, in which Russia is clearly toying with the idea of backing Iran in a confrontation.

Dissuading them from doing so is important, to put it mildly, and Mr. Assad's regime offered a perfect opportunity, probably deliberately, to demonstrate that point.

In other words, why such an open massacre of opponents?

Partly it is to intimidate within Syia, but clearly another statement being made is,"Will the West dance, or just whistle Dixie."

One PGM strike at high value regime and military targets is a reasonable response function for the violation of Security Council Resolutions even the Russians had signed on with, and also a message: There are limits to Western patience,and if it's time to throw down, make our day. Otherwise, let's live a little longer and a little better, and deal with some obvious problems threatening the peace of the region, and the world, and in the case of the region,clearly the Syrian regime is a bad problem getting worse.

finis

What Memorial Day Reminds Us Of: Most Important Citizens

Sun, 27 May 2012 16:05:22 -0400

Memorial Day is the most important holiday in many ways, because it is a reminder of who in fact are the most important citizens in any society: those who defend it.

The Armed Forces can't and shouldn't try to run the country, as that would destroy the ideals of the rule of law and the legally constrained rule of the majority under the rule of law that make us a Republic, but as to centrality, those who defend the country always come first.

They often get left out, but really the police, fire and emergency services come under that rubric of those who risk their lives periodically that others may live.

As to centrality, stockbrokers and the capitalist classes in general wouldn't have employment if nuclear weapons were ever used on American soil because we failed to properly manage relationships with the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and a good number of other states, the most important component of which is a demonstrable willingness of people to serve their country under arms, and if necessary defend it at the price of their lives.

"Job creators" of course are very important, because they create the wealth to buy effective weapons and pay soldiers, but soldiers are the ones who put their bodies on the line in a way uniquely deserving of respect, which this day properly honors.

That doesn't mean you want the people with weapons to rule, as the mentality necessary for the effective use of force is a significantly different one than that required to build a business or preach a sermon, just that they in a real sense are a necessary precondition of what everyone else does, and should be honored accordingly.

Similarly, teachers and non-profit activities, churches most especially included, wouldn't have respectively students and parishoners if the "barbarians" knocked down the gates, although the infusion of what institutions those soldiers defend with ethics and morality is a vital function historically speaking and still of religion and also education to a lesser if very important extent.

All that again however makes the single most important group of citizens not the wealthy, although they always think that, and not the educated or pious, although they have that delusion sometimes, if less so than the wealthy on average, but rather those who put their bodies on the line for the society as a whole, which is the men and women under arms, those of whom who gave their lives for their country this weekend we rightly honor.

You just don't want them to take over things either, but as to respect this weekend as the single most important group of citizens, that would be those who defend society with their lives, and sometimes have to lose it doing so.

finis

Syria, Egypt,& Limits of Idealism in American Foreign Policy

Sun, 27 May 2012 15:05:23 -0400

For Tom Nichols of the Naval War College, and his critique of IR theories he emphasizes that I think is valid and important to always remember, and a great class too.

There is a school of international relations theory and practice of ancient vintage that would in theory not care about domestic instititutions in other States, if that wasn't actually the case in that Realpolitik's first and still greatest expositor: Thucydides.

When one reads the entirety of Thucydides The Pelopennesian War, the tie between domestic and international politics grows in importance in the work as to how that author came to explain the course of the war.

Thus, it's always been recognized by the true masters of Realpolitik that any "billiard ball" approach to international relations, vacant of any ethical content, is misleading in practice, and so therefore bad Realism as to realistically describing what happens.

Turning to the topic at hand at the center of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East, the course of events in Egypt and Syria, the Realistic interpretation is that our pure ideals cannot in practice be fully implemented in either case.

That is not an argument against a massive one-off bombardment of the Assad regime, which has been advocated consistently, if only because it might get lucky, and also, and more traditionally, because of the net demonstration effect for Iran, if others might draw certain conclusions from that as to type.

It is however an argument for paying very close attention to what can and cannot be achieved by American power in the Middle East, something we still struggle with even after the real lesson of Vietnam.

The real lesson of Vietnam is not that we were on the wrong team.

Actually, the Republic of Vietnam was the right team, since they didn't have concentration camps to re-educate their non-Marxist-Leninist opposition.

The real lesson was that in that cultural and temporal (de-colonization) context, it was hard to achieve our policy objectives, especially since we were unwilling to run the risk of a war with China or the Soviet Union.

Our policy objectives were actually idealistic, a free Republic of Vietnam, they just weren't well suited to the power relations of that time, if we'll never know what would have happened had we just firebombed Hanoi like Dresden, and looked at Ivan and China and said, "Is it time for everyone to die, or are we done now?"

We never did that, so we don't know what would have happened, although Chinese intervention over Korea loomed large in that decision, just as Russian and/or Chinese intervention has to be considered with Iran and Syria.

As to the limits of our ideals in the title, what is it most Americans tend to want our foreign policy to achieve in Egypt and Syria?

Most Americans want governments that don't oppress their people, at least to our political and cultural sensibilities, or certainly as in Syria massacre them in large numbers, if there is also the concern of many about how Egypt and Syria will relate to Israel too, as an ideal primarily for those on the Christian "Right," who feel obligated to be supportive of Israel.

The question, as with the Republic of Vietnam is, can we do that at costs we are willing to accept?

The answer isn't really very clear on the optimistic side, if it's not hopeless either.

In the Egyptian case, it was totally predictable as in Syria that the biggest single form of opposition to the regimes would be the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Brothers have been around since the 20s in Egypt, and in Syria, if you survived the "massacre of Hom," you were selected in effect for fitness.

Egypt has fought the Brothers off and on for years, although Sadat was a brother, as was Nasser's original co-ruler, as are many in the Egyptian military, if the latter have to seriiously consider "staying in the closet" to this day on that topic should they want to reach senior command rank.

In Egypt then, when Mubarak fell, it was bound to be hard to prevent the Brothers from winning, if fortunately, many of them seem to understand that their victory could be a Pyrrhic one, especially should Egypt become interenationally isolated, since more than anything, Egypt needs tourists.

The one lever America has then, beyond aid cuts that could easily prove counter-productive, is on State Department dialogues on tourism, where it would seem to the author the more the better, even running risks, as economic desparation hardly encourages political moderation.

That's as good as it gets, other than telling the Brothers and the military that they need to steer a path that Westernized liberals and of course the Copts and Israel can tolerate, or Egypt is likely to head in directions that benefit no one.

Forebearance of the reality of the Brothers has to be a part of that, even as it goes against our ideals.

Similarly in Syria, there is concern that in spite of the truly horrific character of Bashar al Assad's mode of suppression of the revolt against his rule, like father like son, just change Hama for Homs, same dead civilians in large numbers, the replacements won't serve our interests in terms of being Brothers.

Israel one could wonder in particular might think the "devil Assad we know is better than the faceless Islamists we don't know," and that's not meant as a criticism of Israel, as they have to live next door to what happens next, and we don't.

Having said that, since it's hard to see how Assad could ever be legitimate in international dealings again, or how we would really want to tolerate such a thing for other cases, even if we didn't totally like the result in the Syrian case, there remains a valid argument for taking him out, which is a mixture of ideals and self-interests that aren't as morally or "utility maximizing" pure as we'd like, but that's been the case for all time too.

A one off ultimatum might well have the desired effect, if done privately.

finis